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Euro area
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Euro area: consolidating recovery
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In 2010 the euro area will consolidate its recovery...
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The euro area is facing 2010 in much better shape than it started 2009. At that time the financial crisis was at its peak and business was plummeting further than it had in decades. It was difficult to imagine that such a change could come about in just one year. The financial sector has stabilized significantly, there has been a sharp upswing in confidence and economies are growing again. In the third quarter, the euro area posted quarter-on-quarter growth of 0.4%. In year-on-year terms, however, the rate of growth is still being hindered by the strong setbacks it experienced a year ago, so that year-on-year growth is still negative, specifically 4.1%.
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...but we don't expect growth to be too vigorous.
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This trend will continue in the short term, with year-on-year growth getting back into positive figures in the first quarter. Recovery, however, will be slow. In 2010, the gross domestic product (GDP) of the euro area will find it hard to grow much more than 1% and we don't expect growth rates of between 1.5% and 2%, more in line with its growth potential, to be achieved until 2011. Such a slow recovery will mean that the euro area will take several years to return to its pre-recession levels in terms of GDP.
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The process of coming out of recession is supported by the foreign sector...
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A breakdown by growth component in the third quarter reflects the strengths and weaknesses of this recovery. Coming out of recession depends fundamentally on the foreign sector and economic stimulus plans. An example of this is the upswing in the volume of trade, which hadn't seen positive quarter-on-quarter growth for more than a year. Exports are pushing forward with 2.9%, 5 tenths of a percentage point above the rise posted by imports, while the foreign sector's net contribution to growth was 2 tenths of a percentage point.
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...and economic stimulus measures.
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The effect of economic stimulus measures is more difficult to determine. These are partly behind the 0.5% rise in expenditure on public consumption, which contributed one tenth of a percentage point to growth. But these measures have also helped to curb the drop in investment. After losing 4.9% in the first quarter and 1.7% in the second, in the third quarter this only fell by 0.4%, less than initially forecast. We expect this trend to continue in the short term. For example, this is indicated by the PMI (purchasing managers' index) which, although slowing up the rate at which it was increasing, continued to improve in December.
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Consumption continues to show signs of weakness.
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The downside still lies with consumption, falling two tenths of a percentage point compared with the previous quarter and with no positive growth for the last 6 quarters. This weakness in consumption is reflected in poor retail performance which, after a 3.1% fall year-on-year in the first quarter, has fallen by more than 2% in both the second and third quarter. In the month of October retail sales fell by 1.8%, so that no change in trend can be seen for the moment. Another indicator of weak demand is core inflation. In the month of November this continued its slow but substantial downward slide, now standing at 1%, particularly due to the fall in food prices, down 1.2%.
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Throughout the year, the strong and weak points of the economy in the euro area will gradually swap over: first investment and then consumption will start to take over the economy. Trade volumes will continue to rise but improved consumption will mean that imports grow faster than exports, so the net contribution of the foreign sector will become negative.
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Public accounts will deteriorate significantly in 2010.
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On the other hand, the effects of economic stimulus measures will still be positive, although the sharp deterioration in public accounts in 2009 means that these won't be extended much further. In fact, it is very likely there will be increasing pressure for far-reaching reforms to be carried out in some countries. The sharp drop in fiscal revenue, particularly in countries that were highly dependent on just a few sectors, together with higher expenditure related to automatic stabilizers, has raised public deficits and public debt to historic levels.
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Greece and Ireland are the most heavily affected.
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The countries most affected at present are Greece and Ireland. Greece has seen its two main sources of revenue plummet: tourism and trade. The government has had to revise its deficit estimates for 2009 from 6% to 12.7% and the Commission predicts that it will remain at this level in 2010 and 2011. For the first time in 10 years, the Fitch rating agency gave Greece a rating of BBB+, a lower level that reflects its worsening sovereign risk. Its starting point for public finances was not so good either. Greece's level of public debt as a percentage of GDP has not fallen below 100% for the last decade and the European Commission's forecasts place it above 120% in 2010.
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The starting point for Irish public finances was better, as its level of public debt as a percentage of GDP in 2007 was 25%. Thanks to this, the Irish economy has been able to better withstand a threefold collapse: that of the financial system, which has been nationalized, that of the real estate sector and that of international trade. The extent of the impact was perfectly reflected in the falling GDP, this reaching 9.1% year-on-year in the first quarter. The consequent deterioration in public accounts has also been historic: public debt as a percentage of GDP exceeded 50% in 2009 and the European Commission predicts it will be around 80% in 2010.
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The level of debt alone does not tell us whether a country can repay its debts or not. Another figure to take into account is the growth forecast for the coming years, but this does not promise to be very buoyant in either case. Analysts are also keeping their eye on other countries, such as Italy and Portugal, both expected to enjoy moderate growth but with a high level of public debt.
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In fact, the level of debt in the different countries of the euro area will be the focus of many economic debates throughout 2010. But other points will also be of interest that we have already discussed in previous issues of the Monthly Report, such as the possible surge in unemployment and the process of withdrawing monetary expansion policies. In short, there is no doubt that the euro area as a whole is facing 2010 with significantly better prospects than it had a year ago, although its recovery promises to be complicated and will surely provide us with a surprise or two.
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Germany
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Germany: Europe's engine is pulling again
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Germany starts 2010 confidently but with doubts concerning its recovery.
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Germany faces the new year with greater optimism. The road to recovery followed by the German economy since the second quarter of 2009 contrasts sharply with the situation experienced a year ago. Then, the country said goodbye to 2008 with a record fall of 2.4% quarter-on-quarter and forecasts predicted an even greater deterioration in the first quarter of 2009. Now the economy is expected to grow year-on-year in the first three months of 2010, after drops in GDP during five consecutive quarters. However, there is some uncertainty regarding the strength of this recovery.
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The Bundesbank predicts 1.6% growth in 2010.
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The German economy grew 0.7% quarter-on-quarter in the third quarter of 2009, driven by investment and exports. As seen in the above graph, both series took over the role they had held during the last period of economic expansion, once again becoming the main engines in the recovery. This was the result of very different reasons. So while the reactivation of global trade led to growth in German exports, the government's economic stimuli caused public investment to rise.
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In spite of recovery in the main pillars of the economy, its growth is expected to slacken off in the coming quarters. This is the direction taken by the latest forecasts by the German Bundesbank, which estimates a rise in GDP of 1.6% and 1.2% in 2010 and 2011 respectively. The lower growth predicted for 2011 is due to the end of the government's economic stimuli and the future squeeze on public expenditure because of fiscal consolidation.
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One of the key factors affecting the performance of the German economy in the short term will be how private consumption performs. Although it did not decline significantly during the period of greatest recession, this posted a quarter-on-quarter fall of 0.9% in the third quarter of 2009. This trend is expected to continue in 2010 due to the end of tax incentives for the purchase of automobiles and the uncertainty hovering over the labour market. This is reflected in the fall in consumer confidence in October after six months of rises, due to greater pessimism regarding the future. Consequently, inflation, which had returned to positive figures in November, will continue to grow weakly.
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Rising unemployment postpones recovery in private consumption until 2011.
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Trends in private consumption will be closely linked to those of the labour market. After another fall in unemployment in the month of November, standing at 8.1%, and the reactivation of German business, the Bundesbank improved its unemployment forecast. The unemployment rate is therefore expected to reach a maximum of 10.1% in 2011 (4.2 million workers) and, as a result, household consumption will not start to grow until 2011. That's why, in order to relieve this decline, the German government has decided to postpone cutbacks in public expenditure until 2011.
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Industrial activity will continue to grow in spite of its stumble in October.
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The fall in domestic consumption was offset by a rise in exports. This is shown by the figures for October 2009, with a 2.5% growth month-on-month. In spite of this, both production and industrial orders fell this same month, with month-on-month drops of 1.8% and 2.6% respectively. Greater activity in the automobile sector was one of the main reasons. This, together with the still limited utilization of production capacity in Germany in the fourth quarter, suggests that investment will continue at a low level. However, everything points to industrial activity clearly rising, as reflected in the growth in the IFO business climate index in November, reaching similar levels to August 2008.
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The fiscal deficit will shoot up to 6% in 2010.
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Given this outlook, Angela Merkel's government is disposed to maintain its expansionary fiscal policy throughout this year. This means a deficit of 6% in 2010, placing debt at historic levels of 75% compared with GDP. The state of public accounts has led to harsh criticism from the German Court of Auditors. However, the Finance Minister considers that, thanks to the economic recovery and the efforts made in terms of fiscal consolidation as from 2011, the country's public deficits will fall below 3% again in 2013.
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France
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France embarks upon a fragile recovery
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French growth will be moderate during 2010.
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«The French economy will continue to grow at a moderate rate during the first half of 2010». This is the message transmitted by the French Statistics Institute (INSEE) in its latest report on the quarterly situation. France was one of the first developed countries to come out of recession, specifically in the second quarter of 2009, and one of the least affected by it. However, the weakness of the factors underlying this upswing has led to doubts regarding whether recovery can be sustained.
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Unlike other European economies such as Germany, during the last expansionary period France based its growth on solid domestic demand. In the coming quarters, this is expected to take a leading role in growth, particularly regarding public and private consumption. Consequently, according to the INSEE, public consumption will grow in the first half of 2010 to levels similar to those seen in the third quarter last year, namely 0.7% quarter-on-quarter.
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The rise in unemployment may hinder growth in private consumption.
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With regard to private consumption, the most frequent indicators available in the last quarter of 2009 show clear improvement and household consumption was up 1.1% month-on-month in October. It is worth noting the important role played by automobile registrations in this period, with year-on-year increases of 25% and 42% in October and November respectively. Given this situation, consumer confidence improved again in November, both in its present and future component, indicating the increase in private consumption in the last quarter of 2009. However, this recovery is not trouble-free. The decline in the French labour market, reaching an unemployment rate of 10.1% in October, might be an additional obstacle to growth in household consumption.
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On the other hand, foreign demand made a significant contribution to economic growth in the third quarter of 2009. However, everything suggests that this will continue to lose significance in the coming year. The end of stimuli for the purchase of automobiles in some European countries and the tardy recovery of two of France's main trading partners, namely Spain and the United Kingdom, widened the trade deficit in October 2009.
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Private investment will remain limited in the coming quarters.
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Given this weak demand, supply indicators have not managed a strong upswing. Consequently, in October industrial production fell for the second consecutive month, down 0.8% month-on-month, pressurized by the slump in automobile production. In spite of this, industrial confidence grew again in November, although this will not prevent further reductions in private investment throughout 2010 due to the low utilization of production capacity in France.
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French public accounts will continue to decline in 2010.
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In order to avoid stagnation in investment, Sarkozy's government decided to allocate 35,000 million euros to promote research and innovation projects that would otherwise have problems securing private funds in the present climate. However, this undertaking must not be seen as the same as other economic stimulus measures announced to date, as its aim is to increase economic growth in the long term. This, however, has not saved it from the criticism of different supranational bodies such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, which believes such action has come too late and is too imprecise. Moreover, most of this plan will be financed by issuing new debt, which will harm the French public accounts even further, endangering the fiscal consolidation in 2013 that has been demanded by the European Union.
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Italy
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Italy starts the new year with the same old problems
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The Italian economy comes out of recession but still has structural problems.
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Italy came out of recession in the third quarter of 2009 after suffering one of the greatest declines accumulated among the G-7 economies, only exceeded by Japan. Recovery was spread among the different GDP components and only public expenditure posted a fall in this period, down 1.2% quarter-on-quarter. However, the structural weakness of the Italian economy suggests that it will grow at a slower rate in the coming quarters.
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The rise in consumption, up 0.4% in the third quarter, will slow down in 2010.
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Indicators published for the fourth quarter of 2009 confirm these forecasts. On the side of demand, consumer confidence continues at very low levels. One of the main reasons is uncertainty concerning unemployment, particularly after another rise in the third quarter of 2009, up to 7.8%. This trend is expected to continue during the year. Only vehicle registrations still grew strongly, thanks to tax incentives for the purchase of automobiles. However, there are doubts concerning the extension of these plans during 2010. Moderate future growth is therefore predicted in private consumption, lower than the 0.4% quarter-on-quarter recorded in the third quarter of 2009. In spite of this, the rise in oil prices boosted inflation to 0.7% in November, far from the stagnation of July last year.
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With regard to the foreign sector, data from October showed further deficit in the trade balance, with exports the same as the previous month. Given this situation, it's no surprise that industrial production in the month of October was up just 0.5% month-on-month, much lower than expected. However, this did not prevent a further improvement in industrial confidence in November, although the low utilization of production capacity and the expected weakness in demand in the short term suggest private investment will remain the same in 2010.
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The Italian's government's deep debt means that it won't be able to offset this slowdown in recovery in the private sector through greater public consumption. That's why the International Monetary Fund believes public expenditure should be re-focused, aiming it at research, education and innovation in order to solve the economy's structural problems. However, the 2010 government budgets, passed by parliament in December, do not appear to follow these recommendations.
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United Kingdom
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United Kingdom: budgets for an electoral year
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The incipient recovery in British domestic consumption may be cut short in the medium term.
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The United Kingdom is the only G20 economy that is still in recession and it won't be until the end of 2009 when recovery will finally materialize. Domestic consumption has stabilized and is starting to show signs of strength, as indicated by the high growth rates in retail sales and vehicle registrations. However, higher value added tax and the end of aid for the automobile industry at the start of the year will harm the expenditure of households, increasingly eager to save. On the other hand, there are better prospects for foreign demand, with exports growing substantially thanks to the weaker pound.
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Trends in the labour market were a pleasant surprise due to lower unemployment than expected, 5.0% in November, reinforcing the idea that British firms are reacting by moderating wages and not destroying jobs. Industrial production, an indicator of supply, continued stable in October, contradicting analysts' optimistic forecasts and reminding us that the fragile economic context might last for some time yet.
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The government prioritizes a tax hike over cutting costs to reduce its fiscal deficit.
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In December, the main focus of attention was not what the Bank of England might announce, finally maintaining its expansionary monetary policy, but rather the pre-budget report presented every year by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, currently Alistair Darling, containing the fiscal policy for the coming year.
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Darling announced that the government had decided to increase taxes instead of reducing expenditure in an attempt to correct the high general government deficit (12.6% of forecast GDP for 2009) without harming recovery. The measures proposed are not far-reaching and public accounts will not be balanced until 2017, but these plans must be considered within the pre-electoral context, where budget cuts entail political costs.
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A tax will be created that will only affect the British financial sector.
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The budget contained an increase of 0.5 percentage points in National Insurance contributions for those workers earning more than 20,000 pounds, which will come into force as from 2011. Value added tax will return to its previous level in January, up 2.5 percentage points to 17.5%. Lastly, a 50% tax will be levied on bonuses in the financial sector. This will be applied immediately, as from April 2010, and the first 25,000 pounds of the bonus will be exempt. Although, as yet, we don't know how effective this last tax will be, we should remember just how important the financial sector is for the British economy: solid, sustainable growth will not be achieved until this sector has completely recovered.
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Emerging Europe
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Emerging Europe: single region, different futures
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Emerging Europe leavesthe worst behind it but its prospects for 2010 are disparate.
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2009 ends much better than it began in emerging Europe. And if the 2010 forecasts remain on track, we'll be able to repeat as much in twelve months' time. Overall, beyond the generally agreed view that the acute phase of the crisis seems to be over, the pace of activity currently enjoyed by different countries and the growth prospects announced are neither similar nor comparable. With regard to indicators that take the pulse of the economy, and looking at one that provides the best summary, namely that of economic sentiment, two large groups of countries need to be distinguished. The first, made up of Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, has been in recovery for more than half a year. In contrast, the group made up of the remaining economies in the region (the Baltic countries together with Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria), hit bottom much later and had fallen further. Since this low point in the cycle, their activity has recovered with a similar intensity to that of the first group although the current levels are lower.
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It will be difficult for Baltic countries to avoid a second year without sharp falls in GDP.
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The current economic situation indicates that this second group of countries is starting from a disadvantaged position, jeopardizing a dynamic recovery. In fact, if current growth forecasts for 2010 are right, this description might even be seen as too benign. One part of the second group (Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia) will continue in sharp recession in 2010, while the other three (Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria) will probably escape a second year with declining GDP by the seat of their pants (and provided there are no nasty surprises). In contrast to such meagre prospects, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia will grow, if not dynamically then at least quite comfortably. So why are there such differences within the region?
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Firstly, we should note the similarities shared by these economies. With few differences, all have benefitted appreciably from recovery abroad which, combined with the drop in imports due to very weak domestic demand, has helped to turn around the huge deficits in current accounts accumulated during the period of expansion. A second aspect in which these economies resemble each other is that the severity of the crisis has allowed them to redirect their previously recorded excessive inflationary tensions.
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If these are the two big similarities, the key differences come from a combination of three factors: the resistance of the national banking system, the monetary policy followed and the fiscal adjustment required. In general terms, the bigger the macroeconomic imbalances accumulated during the period of expansion that ended in 2008, the more complicated it has been to strike a balance between attempting to alleviate the drop in business and sort out these prior excesses. An extreme case of this can be found in the Baltic countries, three economies that combine a weak banking system (seasoned with excesses in household and company debt in foreign currencies), the need to follow a monetary policy of high interest rates to underpin their currency exchange systems and a slight adjustment in public accounts (in the case of Latvia, related to its programme with the International Monetary Fund).
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Given this triple combination of recessive factors, international investors have been very cautious when assessing the risks of the Baltic countries, assigning them the highest country-risk levels of all emerging Europe. As a recent example of this unease, when the news broke of the problems of Dubai's debt on 25 November, two of the three central governments in emerging Europe that suffered an appreciable increase in tension in their CDS (Credit Default Swaps, an asset that reflects the likelihood of non-payment of public debt) were Latvia and Lithuania. With such a frame of mind, improvement in the international scenario will only partially lead to greater activity, and a renewed fall in growth in 2010 cannot be avoided.
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With a bit of luck, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria may grow again.
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The third country was Hungary. This actually represents several countries found in emerging Europe that have accumulated fewer imbalances and particularly those with a banking system that's under less pressure but which have had to battle fundamentally with the difficulty of handling the recession with restrictive fiscal policy. The extreme case has been, in fact, that of the Hungarian economy, a country that, in full recession, has still been able to post a positive primary public sector surplus, a result that should be interpreted within the context of its commitment to the IMF. Although the cases of Romania (which also benefits from the Fund's financial aid) and Bulgaria are not so extreme with regard to adjustments in public expenditure, all three are economies that will find it hard to grow strongly in 2010.
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Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, clear beneficiaries of a globally balanced macroeconomic situation and of the euro area's recovery.
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The last situation that can be identified in emerging Europe is the one shared by economies with relatively smaller macroeconomic imbalances. This is the situation of Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. These three countriesare in a position to take advantage of the improvement in their key export markets (principally the euro area) without having to page the toll of pro-cyclic monetary or fiscal policy. This will allow them to enjoy positive growth rates of a certain size in 2010.
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2010, the year of decoupling?
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Will emerging countries break away from mature economies?
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One of the issues that might affect 2010 in economic terms is the role to be played by emerging economies. During the difficult years of 2008 and 2009, debate raged concerning the capacity of China and the main emerging economies to sustain their expansion when the United States and other industrialized countries were entering recession. This phenomenon became known as decoupling. This issue is still relevant and the question now is whether this decoupling will intensify in 2010 and beyond. To answer this question thoroughly we must look at three stages. Firstly, defining precisely what decoupling is and isn't. Secondly, measuring the phenomenon. Then, and only then, will we be able to plausibly predict future decoupling trends.
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In its strictest sense, the decoupling of two economies or groups of economies means that both exhibit a limited degree of cyclic synchronization. Defined thus, decoupling combines two complementary aspects. First we must understand what academic literature has come to call pure synchronicity. Behind this somewhat cryptic expression lies the simple fact that two economies can be situated in the same phase of the cycle (expansion or contraction) or not. A second aspect of decoupling concerns the distance separating the cycle positions of two economies.(1)
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The importance of this distinction can be appreciated by means of a simple numerical example. The starting point must be some measurement of an economy's cyclic position. The most usual measurement is the so-called output gap, i.e. the distance between the gross domestic product (GDP) of an economy at a specific point in time and the trend in or potential GDP. Potential GDP is the GDP that is compatible with the full use of output factors. Economic cycles are therefore defined by alternate positive and negative output gaps.
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Based on these measurements, two economies will therefore record decoupling when either there is a positive output gap in one and a negative gap in the other (i.e. an absence of strict synchronicity) or the distance in absolute terms between both output gaps is significant. In order to use more direct terminology, we will call the first case «sign» decoupling (as we are comparing the positive or negative sign of the output gaps) and the second case «intensity» decoupling, as in this case the distance between output gaps is compared. The results of these two measurements are presented in the two graphs below.
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In the first of these graphs, an indicator of «sign» decoupling has been calculated so that, when two economies record an output gap of the same sign, the indicator gives a result of +1, while if the sign of the gaps is different, the result is 1. A comparison is made between the average of 24 industrialized economies and a set of 22 emerging economies. As can be seen, the degree of «sign» synchronicity has tended to fluctuate during the current decade up to the outbreak of the worldwide economic crisis. In fact, two clearly different patterns of behaviour can be distinguished. Between 2000 and 2005, the degree of sign synchronicity was highly volatile, alternating years with the greatest synchronicity in the decade and others with the least. Since 2006, the overall trend has been towards greater synchronicity, fluctuating within a narrower range. This structural change has been related to the advance of globalization throughout the first decade of the millennium.
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Focusing now on the recent crisis, during its early stages (2006 and 2007) an increase was noted in cyclic synchronicity between industrialized and emerging economies. In 2008, synchronicity intensified when the worsening of financial tensions coincided with the entry into recession of numerous economies at the end of the year. Only in 2009, when the crisis was probably in its most extreme phase, did «sign» decoupling increase. From then on, and based on the growth forecasts given by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for the period 2010 to 2012, we will have two years of another decline in «sign» decoupling and then, in 2012, it will return again.
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The «intensity» decoupling indicator, a less volatile and more accurate measure of decoupling, provides similar findings. First off, it also shows a trend towards less decoupling between 2006 and 2008, as well as confirming the slight increase in 2009. Based on the IMF forecasts, the phenomenon should subside in 2010 and 2011 but in 2012 should return to similar decoupling levels as in 2009. In short, the answer to whether 2010 will be a year of decoupling is in the negative. Provided the world economy takes the route expected by the Fund, neither the «sign» nor the «intensity» indicator supports the notion of a year of intense decoupling. What might be behind this predicted trend?
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The discussion of the determining factors that lie behind the degree of cycle synchronicity between economies is not fully conclusive as results depend on the interaction of many different factors, such as the type of economic shock experienced (particularly whether it is global or specific to a country or sector) and the type of transmission channel between economies. However, there are three factors that may lead to lesser decoupling in 2010. Firstly, it seems that, in the second half of 2009, emerging countries have «advanced» in the cycle, a circumstance that is likely to abate in 2010 when industrialized economies improve their rate of business. A second factor that might contribute to greater global synchronicity is the recovery in international trade, partly due to credit gradually getting back to normal, making it easier for the push made by some economies to be passed on to others more intensely and rapidly. Lastly, this same improvement in credit should boost the incipient recovery in the global investor cycle. In 2011, these three trends will intensify but afterwards... afterwards the emerging countries will probably go back to their old ways again. In summary, the decoupling debate, like the phenomenon itself, seems destined to go through numerous appearances and disappearances.
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(1) For a complete explanation of the methodology and an example of its application, see Mink, M., Jacobs, J.P.A.M. and J. De Haan (2007). «Measuring synchronicity and co-movement of business cycles with an application to the euro area», CESifo Working Paper, no. 2112.
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This box was prepared by Àlex Ruiz
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International Unit, "la Caixa" Research Department
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